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been proved that every contingency can not be specifically provided
for. It seems that the vast public interest involved in securing an
adequate national defense offsets any notion of involuntary servitude
when the servitude imposed pertains to any phase of this national
defense. It would seem that in curtailing the drug menace, there is
also a public interest involved, differing more in kind than in degree.
It requires but little reflection to perceive that unsurpassed activity
of the forces of drug addiction would wreak grave social conse-
quences, consequences calculated to motivate alarm and deference
equal to that incited by the exigencies of war. This contention is
borne out and emphasized by the definition of a drug addict as defined
by the Narcotic Farm Act under which the Lloyd case was decided:
"The term 'addict' means any person who habitually uses any habit-
forming narcotic drug . . . so as to endanger the public morals,
health, safety, or welfare, or who is or ;has been so far addicted to the
use of such habit-forming drugs as to have lost the power of self-
control with reference to his addiction".'
SAM MINExR..
JUDGMENTS: QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES; RES JUDICATA
In an election held in a fourth class city in Kentucky, the cer-
tificate of the County Board of Election Commissioners filed with the
common council showed that the plaintiff had received a majority of
the votes cast for the office of councilman. He appeared at the proper
place, took the required oath and assumed his duties as an authorized
member of that board. The statute provides that, "The board . . .
shall judge of the eligibility and election returns of its members".'
Accordingly a contest was filed by his opponent before the common
council. It asked that the plaintiff be declared ineligible to hold the
office, and that his opponent be given the certificate of election. Plain-
tiff entered his answer and denial, but before the matter proceeded
further the attorney for the contestant entered his motion for a simple
dismissal. The order by the council allowing the motion declared
further that the plaintiff had been duly elected. Four months later,
represented by the same attorney, the contestant appeared before the
council and stated that he had not advised or consented that the con-
test be dismissed, and that it had been done without his knowledge.
He asked that the order of dismissal be set aside. This was done and
a hurried trial resulted in a decision favorable to him. He was im-
mediately sworn in as councilman, replacing plaintiff, and this action
was entered in a circuit court of that state asking that he be re-
strained from in any way interfering with the plaintiff in his office
as councilman. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in approving the
judgment of the trial court in granting the relief sought, said, In the
concluding paragraph of its opinion, "the order of the council made
on January 28, 1936, seating Hughes and determining that he had
T21 U. S. C. A. 221(b).
STUDENT NOTES
been duly elected, was a final disposition of the case and the later
performance had on April 21 thereafter was corum non judice and void
since such quasi-judicial bodies, when so functioning, are to be gov-
erned by the res judicata doctrine the same as, and for the same
reason that, it applies to the duly constituted courts"?
Application of the doctrine of res judicata to findings of quasi-
judicial bodies is not of late origin. This rule which forbids the re-
opening of a matter once judicially determined by a duly authorized
court was not restricted to the judgments and decrees of such a court
even under the early common law.3 The courtroom has never been
a very pleasant retreat for men whose differences were the result
of honest misunderstanding. These differences have rested mainly
in a mistake of fact, and, rather than submit them to courts ,and
suffer the burdens of costs and delay which have always attached to
courts, men early sought solution of them through voluntary boards of
arbitration. Awards returned by them upon the questions submitted
for their determination were as binding as judgments of a duly
authorized court and could be successfully pleaded at common law in
bar of any later action involving the same matter and between the
same parties.4 This method of voluntary arbitration as followed and
enforced by the common law was looked upon with such, favor that
the legislatures of various states enacted statutes which gave the
courts power to appoint arbitrators when -applied to by one of the
parties to the litigation These boards of compulsory arbitration
proceed to hear the matter submitted for their determination, and
their awards are given the effect of judgments which are conclusive
upon the parties unless reversed on appeal.
The growth of government has made an ever increasing number
cf administrative bodies a necessity and often their duties require
them to make decisions judicial in their nature. These statutory
bodies have been given power to hear and determine facts from evi-
dence submitted to them and to make orders and decrees concerning
them. Most always the statute giving such boards or officers the
power to render a judgment in a matter provides for an appeal, either
to a court or a higher officer, but the judgment is binding and con-
cludes the parties unless appealed in the time allowed and thereafter
modified.
The decisions of such boards would have been without effect, ex-
cept for the character of permanency given them by the application
of the rule of res judicata. Two cases will suffice to demonstrate this
statement.
1 Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, Section 3486.
"Muncy v. Hughes, 97 S. W. (2d) 546 (Kentucky) (1936).
33 Black. Com. 16; Caldwell, Arbitration (2nd Amer. Ed., 1853),
264 et seq.
IGarvin v. Dawson, 13 Serg. & R. 246 (Pa. 1830); Loyd v. Barr,
11 Pa. 41 (1849).
5 Constitution of Kentucky, Section 250; Carroll's Kentucky Stat-
utes (1932 Ed.), Sees. 69, et seq.
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The police commissioners of the city of Atlanta, Ga., by its
charter, were authorized to exercise full direction and control over
its police force and were given power to discharge any member guilty
of immoral conduct. Complaint was filed against a policeman In which
he was charged with immoral conduct committed before his contract
of employment. A hearing resulted in his discharge. He sued for
what would have been due him under his contract had he been allowed
to have continued his services, setting up in his petition that he had
been wrongfully discharged. The court held that the matter was res
judicata. He was concluded by the judgment of the commissioners,
and when he failed to seek a reversal by appeal, which the statute
allowed, he was as definitely concluded by its terms as if It had been
the judgment of a regularly constituted court, and the correctness of
their ruling could no longer be questioned.0
Again, the statute of Indiana provided that claims against a
county should be filed with its auditor and the board of commissioners
for the county should have exclusive jurisdiction to determine their
validity. A claim was presented and an order was made disallowing
it. Later the statute was changed taking this power from the com-
missioners and the same claim was renewed in the proper court. It
was held that the decision of the commissioners under their power
at the time they acted was binding, and the matter closed.? By
hearing the proof of claim and rendering a decision upon it, the com-
missioners constituted themselves a court of limited jurisdiction under
the power given them under the statute and acted In a judicial
capacity. Their decision was binding at the time It was made and
could only be avoided by reversal on appeal.
Not every court has held that the allowance or disallowance of
claims against a county or town is a judicial act.' However, judgments
and orders of many boards and administrative officers acting in this
capacity have come before state and federal courts for review and the
application of the res judicata doctrine has been generally admitted.'
It is not necessary then that the person making the decision be a
court. The essential requirements are that the party has power to
pass upon the question submitted for his judgment, and that the de-
cision be upon the merits after notice and hearing. The instant case
was not lacking in any of these particulars. The council was the sole
agency for hearing and passing upon the matter. The statute had
made it so. There was notice and hearing. The decision was upon
the merits. This last statement will not be so readily agreed to as will
the two just preceding it, but a reference to the statement of facts
will help to clear it up. It was stated there that the attorney for the
contestant made his motion for a simple dismissal and the order by
' Queen v. Atlanta, 59 Ga. 318 (1877). '
Maxwell v. Fulton County, 119 Ind. 20, 19 N. E. 617 (1889).
'Sears v. Stone County, 105 Mo. 236, 16 S. W. 878 (1891).
'Placer County v. Campbell, 70 Cal. 127, 11 Pae. 602 (1886);
Kelly v. Wimberly, 61 Miss. 548 (1884); Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98
N. Y. 222 (1885); Colusa County v. DeJarnett, 55 Cal. 375 (1880).
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the council allowing same declared the plaintiff elected and eligible
to hold the office. The order of dismissal contained no term or ex-
pression granting a right or privilege to the contestant to take further
legal proceedings in the matter. The contestant could not institute
a new action for when such rights and privileges were not reserved
in the order of dismissal the decision was presumed to have been
rendered upon the merits and forever concluded the matter.0 Neither
could he have the order of dismissal and the judgment included
therein set aside, for he was bound by the acts of his attorney in
the case. An attorney has "exclusive control of the remedy, and may
continue or discontinue it", meaning the suit." And though the dis-
missal has the effect to destroy the cause of action because of igno-
rance of the law or fact which the attorney should have known, it
will nevertheless be conclusive.,
The Council under the statute was given the exclusive power to
determine the election returfis and eligibility of its members and no
appeal is granted from its decision in the matter. But once it has
heard and determined the matter it cannot reopen the question again.
Res judicata denies a re-adjudication of a matter in the court which
rendered a former decision in the matter, the same as it would in a
court unknown to the first action. This rule applies with equal force
to deny a board the right to re-adjudicate a matter, once determined
by it. In Hadley v. City of Albany, Mr. Hadley had been a candidate
for mayor of Albany, New York. A statute of that state provided that
the common council should judge of the election returns of the newly
elected officers. The council canvassed the returns and declared him
elected. Later a new canvass was had declaring another the winner.
The court said in upholding the first canvass, the duty "having been
once legally performed, the power of the council was exhausted; the
board had no right to reverse its decision by making a different de-
termination".Y Once the council determined the plaintiff was elected,
its powers In the matter ended.
Then, "a decision rendered by an officer or board of a state or
municipal officers, when acting judicially, and which has by law the
force and effect of a judgment, is a bar to further actions on the same
matter between the parties or their privies", and the doctrine of res
judicata "applies as well to their judicial or quasi-judicial acts as
to the judgments of courts having general power".' Without the sup-
porting influence of such a rule, their work would be without force
and of no value, BARNMY Wicox BAxEF.
"Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U. S. 154 (1868); Cooper, Equity Plead-
ing, 270; Story, Equity Pleading, 793; Inter-Mountain Coal & Lbr. Co.
v. Harris, 223 Ky. 258, 3 S. W. (2d) 602 (1928).
" Weeks, Attorneys 220; Barrett v. The Third Ave. Railroad Co.,
45 N. Y. 628 at 635 (1871).
' Juneau County v. Hooker, 67 Wis. 332, 30 N. W. 357 (1886);
Badon v. MItchell, 14 N. D. 454, 106 N. W. 129 (1906).
,'Hadley v. City of Albany, 33 N. Y. 603 (1865).
" 24 Am. & Eng. Cyc. of Law, 718; 23 Cyc. 1115.
